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The need for flexibility is clearly evident. Unless state governments can
and will adapt themselves to changing economic and social environ-
ments, their importance in the total structure of American government
will diminish. Certainly the experiences of these last three decades have
demonstrated that the locus of power moves to that level of government
which has fiscal capacity to act, and which does act. One of the clear
lessons from the "failure" of state and local governments during the
economic depression of the 1930's is that the people tend to rely upon
the unit of government which produces the services they need and
want.'
I. INTRODUCTION
A steep increase in state and local government expenditures is
almost inevitable.2 This is an ongoing trend which has already produced
fiscal crises in many states.' Election promises to "hold the line" or
"trim the fat" are understandable in light of the "tax mortality" of
governors,4 but increased needs are real" and the only way to reduce
* Member of the Florida Bar; Partner, Pallot, Marks Lundeen, Poppell & Horwich,
Miami, Florida; Lecturer in Law, University of Miami School of Law. It should be noted
that this article was originally submitted for the Summer issue and therefore there was no
opportunity to include materials subsequent to the summer of 1966.
1. Landers, Constitutional Provisions on Taxation & Finance, 33 STATE Gov'T 39,
40-41 (1960).
2. Ecker-Racz, State Taxes for the 1970's, 39 STATE GOV'T 14-15 (1966); MAXWELL,
FINANCING STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 19-23 (1965); Anderson, Can the State Live on
Crumbs?, Saturday Rev., Jan. 9, 1965, p. 31. These sources indicate that state and local
expenditures may double each ten-year period and may even exceed federal spending
within another decade, depending on international developments. They tend to be con-
firmed by recent news that 1965 state and local tax collections exceeded those of the
preceding year by 8.2 per cent, increasing from 49.8 to 53.9 billion dollars. 44 TAXES 360
(1966).
3. E.g., Myers & Stout, The Changing Pattern of State Tax Systems: Pennsylvania,
New Jersey, Indiana, Michigan & Wisconsin, 1964 NAT'L TAX A. PROC. 198-99.
4. Anderson, supra note 2, at 31; Senior Scholastic, April 1, 1965, p. 12.
5. VIEo ET AL., CALIFORNIA LOCAL FINANCE 101-03 (1960) (special significance of in-
creasing teachers' salaries).
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costs substantially would be to adopt a different set of values regarding
the obligation of society to help its less fortunate members."6
Tax resources, like the economy itself, have become national rather
than local,7 so it is not surprising to find a vast growth in federal
grants to state and local government, coupled with substantial pressure
to increase that assistance by leaps and bounds.' But massive federal
aid casts a shadow over the whole system of federalism. Of the
possible varieties of increased federal support,'0 a likely choice is a
credit against the federal income tax for state taxes, so as to recognize
the efforts of each state to tax its own citizens." Thus, state and local
governments should not rely on federal funds to meet growing needs.
Other non-tax revenues must be mentioned. User charges for some
public services could be increased, such as downtown parking, 2 but
user charges are appropriate only in the narrow area where there is a
direct benefit of measurable value and only in small amounts for which
the ability to pay may be assumed. 8 State lotteries are of wide current
interest for "escapists" from the problems of fair and adequate taxation. 4
Reliance on such a means of raising revenue seems both improbable and
undesirable.' More likely, the bulk of increasing state and local needs
must be met by taxation, as they are now.'
On an overall basis, Florida's efforts to use its tax resources do
not appear unusually good or shockingly poor. Yet, a recent survey
6. Id. at 101. Federal, state and local tax funds already pay more than half of hospital
care and nearly one-third of other medical services for all New York City families. Piore,
Metropolitan Medical Economics, Sci. Am., Jan. 1965, p. 19. On the other hand, as of
June, 1963, Florida was one of the minority of states placing a dollar limit on aid to
families with dependent children and, of the states with limits, Florida has set the lowest
ceiling on aid to each family unit. Sparer, Social Welfare Law Testing, Practical Lawyer,
April 1966, p. 13, at 21.
7. Ecker-Racz, supra note 2, at 17.
8. See Anderson, supra note 2. During the fiscal year ended June 30, 1965, Florida state
revenues included about 850 million dollars in taxes and about 232 million dollars in
federal aid. FLORIDA COMPTROLLER, FLORIDA TAXES & ExEarTIoNs, 1965-1966, at 18-19.
9. Ecker-Racz, supra note 2, at 17; quotation in text accompanying note 1 supra.
10. See Anderson, supra note 2.
11. N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1966, p. 1, col. 1 (recent recommendations of the federal Ad-
visory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations [hereinafter referred to as ACIR]).
12. Prentice, The Great Urban Tax Tangle, Fortune, March, 1965, p. 106, at 195-96.
13. VIEO ET AL., CALIFORNIA LOCAL FINANCE 210 (1960). Also, the cost of administration
must be low. Ibid. Pricing benefits is appropriate for business regulation and inspection,
not for welfare functions. Chatters, New Money for Cities, 50 NAT'L CIvic REv. 298, 303
(1961). Official fees not based on the value of the services are really taxes. I COOLEY,
TAXATION 108-10 (4th ed. 1924). Compare Finlayson v. Conner, 167 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1964).
14. New Hampshire is the principal exponent; it has neither a sales tax nor an in-
come tax and sells close to ninety per cent of its lottery tickets to out-of-staters. Time,
April 1, 1966, p. 80; see American City, July, 1963, p. 7.
15. Rosen & Norton, The Lottery As a Source of Public Revenue, 44 TAXES 617 (1966).
It has been called "the most extreme form of 'sucker finance.'" SLY, TAX ASSETS & TAX
POICIaEs in FLORIDA 2 (1964).
16. ACIR, MEASURES OF STATE & LOCAL FISCAL CAPACITY & TAX EFFORT 1 (1962).
17. Id. at 75-77.
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concluded that "its present tax structure in its present condition will
not rise to its expanding requirements in either quantity or quality of
service."' 8 Reapportionment and urban domination of the Legislature
do not solve this problem automatically. It is necessary to examine the
opportunities open to the Legislature to raise needed funds by changes
in Florida taxation.
To a large extent, the Florida Legislature will find itself tied hand
and foot.'" Many of these fetters have been imposed by the people of the
state and are imbedded in the Florida Constitution; with respect to
these, the Legislature can only initiate the desirable changes. Other
limitations stem from acts or omissions of earlier Legislatures and can
be remedied by statute. This study, however, will group the problems
as state, or as local, rather than according to whether the barriers are
constitutional or legislative.
II. STATE TAXATION
A. The Income Tax
"No taxes . upon the income of residents or citizens of this State
shall be levied by the State of Florida, or under its authority, .. ,
Only Florida has such a constitutional prohibition.2' Many states, how-
ever, have or had a constitutional requirement of "uniform and equal"
taxation; in some of these states it has been held applicable to income
taxes, barring any income tax except a strictly proportional tax without
graduated rates or minimum exemptions.2 2 Florida has a constitutional
imperative of "uniform and equal" taxation, 2' but, in the face of the
express ban against any income taxation, the Florida courts have not
had to decide whether or not an income tax must be precisely propor-
tional. To grant the Legislature full power in the area of a state income
tax, therefore, it would be best to modify or eliminate the "uniform and
equal" clause as well as repealing the specific ban against income taxa-
tion.24 (No attempt is made here, however, to decide for the Legislature
"the uneasy case for progressive taxation.") 2 5
18. SLY & FRANK, BusiNEss TAXES IN FLORIDA 39 (1964).
19. Such limitations, although criticized severely in this and other studies, are not
peculiar to Florida. Morrow, State Constitutional Limitations on the Taxing Authority of
State Legislatures, 9 NAT'L TAX J. 126 (1956); ACIR, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL & STATU-
TORY RESTRICTIONS ON LOCAL TAXinG POWERS (1962).
20. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 11.
21. NEWHOUSE, CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY & EQUALITY IN STATE TAXATION 32,
744-45 (1959) ; INDEX DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITTIONS 1021-22 (2d ed. 1959).
22. NEWnOUSE, OP. cit. supra note 21, at 690-766; HELLERSTEIN, STATE & LOCAL
TAXATION 39-43 (2d ed. 1961).
23. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
24. NEWHOUSE, op. cit. supra note 21, at 765-66.
25. See generally BLUM & KALVEN, TnE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION
(1953).
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Is there a place for a state income tax in Florida? Around the turn
of the century, Professor Seligman effectively urged the taxation of
income as the best measure of the ability to pay.26 Income is an especially
significant element in describing potential tax resources in Florida today."
But in 1924 the Florida Constitution was amended to prohibit income
taxation, as described above, and Florida has become a "sales and
excise tax state."2 Consequently, evaluation of the income tax raises
the same question in Florida that it does in so many states: How does an
income tax compare with a sales tax?29
One issue, although of doubtful relevance to equity, is of extreme
practical importance to legislators-voter acceptability. It appears that
the same amount of revenue can be extracted from the taxpayers with
far less complaint by the relatively concealed burden of the sales tax
than by the obvious burden of the income tax.3°
On the other hand, the burden of the sales tax, although substantially
concealed, clearly rests on the consumer."' This gives rise to the most
serious criticism of sales taxation; it is regressive because the burden
is allocated according to consumption expenditures and people in low-
income classes spend a larger proportion of their income on such taxed
items than people with larger incomes, who can retain savings and invest
them in non-taxable transactions.3 2 As the leading student of sales
taxation explains, it is less fair than the income tax because it penalizes
those whose circumstances compel them to spend comparatively higher
percentages of their income, such as taxpayers with many dependents. 38
In reply, it can be pointed out that steeply progressive federal income
taxes result in an overall tax burden that is roughly proportional for
annual incomes up to about fifteen thousand dollars and progressive above
26. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX (2d ed. rev. 1914).
27. "Income is the best single measure of tax capacity, . . ." SLY, TAX ASSETS & TAX
PoLucIEs IN FLORIDA 6 (1964).
28. Id. at ii.
29. The issues discussed in the text, other than those peculiar to Florida, are based on
the summary in MAXWELL, FINANCING STATE & LocAL GOVERNMENTS 100-03 (1965). If all
the states were to act in unison, the comparison might dearly raise issues important to the
overall national economy and not treated in this study. See generally SmULTz & HARaiss,
AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE 169 (8th ed. 1965); DUE, GOVERNMENT FINANCE 251 (3d ed.
1963); both note the influence of KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX (1955). Yet, the signifi-
cance of comparing savings or investment results has been challenged. Goode, Income, Con-
sumption & Property as Bases of Taxation, 52 Am. ECON. REv. PAPERS & PEOC. 327 (1962).
30. MAXwELL, op. cit. supra note 29, at 100-01.
31. OSTER, STATE RETAIL SALES TAXATION 3 (1957).
32. MAXWELL, op. cit. supra note 29, at 96.
33. DUE, SALES TAXATION 39-40 (1957). There is still substantial current debate about
this view, particularly in light of sophisticated new concepts of "income." For a summary,
see the following series of articles in NAT'L TAX J.: Morgan, Reappraisal of Sales Taxation:
Some Recent Arguments, vol. 16, p. 89 (1963); Davies, A Further Reappraisal of Sales
Taxation, vol. 16, p. 410 (1963); Morgan, A Comment on "A Further Reappraisal of Sales
Taxation," vol. 17, p. 418 (1964).
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that.84 However, the likelihood of state and local taxation soon pulling
far ahead of federal taxation threatens increasingly regressive distribution
of tax burdens.3 5
Another issue is revenue stability. Income tax revenues expand
and contract with business cycles while sales tax revenues are more
stable, avoiding the problems of state and local borrowings to cover
deficits during bad times. By the same token, income taxation is elastic
enough to keep up with the growth of the economy without change in
rate or base while new state and local spending requires rate hikes or
increased bases for sales taxes, as well as for the other primary state
and local revenue source, the property tax. 6 Some areas in the United
States already pay a combined state and local sales tax rate of six percent,
and previous expert estimates that even much smaller rates would
be reduced have proved thoroughly wrong.3 7
Administration costs may be slightly lower for the income tax and
the burden of compliance less centered on the business community."8
State income tax administration could lean heavily on the federal tax
system with proper cooperation and state laws. 9 The cooperation, as is
well known, has been forthcoming, but state income tax laws have
varied widely from the federal provisions, partly because of state con-
stitutional limits (and any Florida constitutional amendment should
permit incorporation by reference of the Internal Revenue Code and,
automatically, of all changes adopted by Congress).4 Sales tax admin-
34. Bishop, The Tax Burden by income Class, 1958, 14 NAT'L TAX J. 41 (1961). Per-
haps this is the basis of Dr. Sly's report that Florida emphasizes proportional taxation.
SLY, TAX ASSETS & TAX POLICiES IN FLORIDA iii (1964); otherwise it may be more of a
hope than a fact.
35. Ecker-Racz, State Taxes for the 1970's, 39 STATE Gov'T 14 (1966). Higher social
security taxes may be a regressive factor. Aaron, Rate Progressivity & the Direct Taxation
of Personal Income, 44 TAXES 497 (1966).
36. MAXWELL, op. cit. supra note 29, at 22-23, 103.
37. House Comm. on Judiciary, Spec. Subcomm. on State Tax of Interstate Commerce
[hereinafter referred to as Spec. Subcomm.], 3 State Taxation of Interstate Commerce,
H.R. REP. No. 565, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 611-13 (1965).
38. MAXWELL, op. cit. supra note 29, at 102.
39. PENrnVNAN & HELLER, STATE INCOME TAX ADMINISTRATION, ch. IX (1959). Even
Professor Seligman originally favored income taxes only at the federal level, but he
changed his mind after adoption of the federal tax on the grounds that state tax administra-
tion had improved and that reliance on federal returns would materially help state ad-
ministration. SELIGMAN, EssAys IN TAXATION 650-52 (10th ed. rev. 1925).
40. PENNIMAN & HELLER, op. cit. supra note 39; Spec. Subcomm., 1 State Taxation of
Interstate Commerce, H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88 Cong., 2d Sess., chs. 8, 17 (1964). To re-
solve disputes about state and local taxation of interstate commerce, a special House sub-
committee has proposed, among other things, that state and local income taxation of inter-
state corporations be required to use the federal base with only a few types of deviations
permitted. Spec. Subcomm., 4 State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, H.R. RP. No. 952,
89th Cong., Ist Sess. 1158-61 (1965), incorporated in H.R. 11798, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965).
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istration also requires a variety of reforms,4' but there is no corresponding
federal system to look to for assistance.42
Perhaps the determinative issue is the effect of high federal income
taxes; it is argued that the cumulative burden of two income taxes
will induce persons with high incomes to leave the state.43 Sales taxation
may be uniquely useful in a federal system where one level of govern-
ment has pre-empted income taxation.44 But the very fact of regression
in state taxation discourages the reduction of federal taxes to make
room for state and local levies.45 Indeed, a recent recommendation of
the Federal Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations is
that there be a federal income tax credit, of about 40 per cent perhaps,
for state income taxes; the proposal is that any state without an income
tax should adopt one since only the elastic income tax can keep abreast
of rising state and local expenditures.4" This would be economic coercion,
and Florida has surrendered to similar pressure once before, in connection
with the death tax.47
Although it is said that there is no basic pattern of state sales
taxation, the Florida sales tax seems to have little that is unique in the
way of defining base or granting exemptions.4" There is a possibility
that sales taxation is unusually useful to Florida as a way of allocating
some of the tax burden to tourists (if that is a wise thing to do)." On
the other hand, there are certain penalties Florida's tax system pays
for the absolute prohibition of income taxation, despite the chosen
emphasis on sales and other taxes.
For example, the Florida intangible tax cannot reach the life estate
of a Florida beneficiary in an out-of-state trust unless the beneficiary
41. DuE, STATE SAILS TAX ADMINISTRATION, ch. XII (1963).
42. But see Spec. Subcomm., 4 State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, H.R. REP. No.
952, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1183-87 (1965), incorporated in H.R. 11798, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1965). A voluntary model sales tax law is proposed for states wanting to participate
in broader sales taxation of interstate sellers. However, it is not comprehensive; for ex-
ample, the question of what services to tax is left open, and that is a major contemporary
issue in state sales taxation. Conlon, Some Tax & Revenue Problems of the States, 33
STATE GOV'T 114, 115-16 (1960).
43. MAXWELL, op. cit. supra note 29, at 101-102.
44. DUE, SALES TAXATION 40-41, 387 (1957) and, later, GOVERNMENT FINANCE 301-02
(3d ed. 1963).
45. Anderson, Can the State Live on Crumbs?, Saturday Rev., Jan. 9, 1965, p. 31, 32-33.
46. N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1966, p. 1, col. 1.
47. Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12 (1927) (federal death tax credit upheld); FLA.
CONST. art. IX, § 11 (amended in 1930 to permit use of federal death tax credit).
48. See generally Spec. Subcomm., 3 State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, H.R. REP.
No. 565, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. ch. 21 (1965).
49. SLY, TAX ASSETS & TAX POLICIES IN FLORIDA 7 (1964). But see SLY & FRANK,
BusxNEss TAXES IN FLORIDA 6 (1964) (tourism "subject to rapid and extreme reversals");
MAXWELL, op. cit. supra note 29, at 103 ("guess that the net amount of tribute is exag-
gerated"); Cartwright, The Washington Tax Structure as Viewed by the Consumer, 39
WASr. L. REv. 1000, 1008 (1965) (better handled in other ways).
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has some sort of power over disposition of the principal, the bare right
to income being exempt." The solution to this and other intangible tax
problems may well be to replace that tax with an income tax."
An entirely different sort of limitation affects the interesting value-
added tax developed in Europe; this tax is typically imposed at manufac-
turing and wholesale levels (and sometimes retail, too) upon the
difference between the selling price and the cost of materials purchased,
i.e., it falls on wages, rent, interest and profits. 2 From an economist's
viewpoint, it is essentially an improved version of a manufacturers'
sales tax,53 but Florida, a sales tax state, cannot safely experiment with
supplementing (or replacing) its retail sales tax with a value-added
tax because the only such tax in the United States is the Michigan
business activities tax, which has been held to be an income tax.
54
Finally, Florida is one of the sales tax states that exempts groceries,
thus making the sales tax much less regressive. Every fiscal crisis
poses the dilemma of raising the rate or ending the equitable exemption."0
Far better than the broad exemption, which benefits the rich more than
the poor, is an annual fixed per capita sales tax credit; the best way
to handle this, since the sales tax is not remitted by the consumer, is
by an Indiana-type credit against an annual income tax.5 That Florida
cannot unwind its Gordian knot in this fashion is, perhaps, the most
ironical by-product of its inflexible constitutional ban against income
taxation.
In the last analysis, such inflexibility is the gist of the problem.
58
50. Compare Mahan v. Lummus, 160 Fla. 505, 35 So.2d 725 (1948) (no tax despite
trustee's power to invade for emergency), with Hexter v. Gautier, 153 So.2d 713 (Fla.
1963) (conditional power to appoint subject to tax). See also [1959-1960] FLA. ATT'Y
GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 402, indicating that the power to revoke may not be taxable if con-
sent of any other person is required.
51. SLY & FRANK, BusINEss TAXES IN FLORIDA 37-38 (1964).
52. Norr, Sales Taxes in Europe & Canada in REPORT OF 1962 NATIONAL TAX CON-
FERENCE OF CANADIAN TAX FOUNDATION 243-253 (1963); Shoup, Theory & Background of
the Value-Added Tax in 1955 NAT'L TAX A. PROC. 6.
53. Norr, supra note 52, at 270-71.
54. Armco Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, 359 Mich. 430, 102 N.W.2d 552, appeal dis-
missed, 364 U.S. 337 (1960).
55. DuE, SALES TAXATION 25-29 (1957); Davies, The Relative Burden of Sales Taxa-
tion: A Statistical Analysis of California Data, 19 Am. J. EcoN. & Soc. 289 (1960) ; MAX-
WELL, op. cit. supra note 29, at 96-97. Professor Due suggests that the "food exemption
may become almost imperative" if revenue needs require high rates. DuE, op. cit. supra, at
377.
56. SLY, TAX ASSETS & TAX POLICIES IN FLORIDA 30 (1964); SLY & FRANK, BusINEss
TAXES IN FLORIDA 49-50 (1964). The latter authority estimates that eliminating the food
exemption would have produced sixty million dollars revenue for Florida and asserts that
the change "would make little difference in the budgets of low income groups"; this seems
rather harsh, even at present low rates.
57. DuE, SALES TAXATION 378-80 (1957); Ecker-Racz, State Taxes for the 1970's, 39
STATE Gov'T 14, 18 (1966) ; see 43 TAXES 669-70 (1965) (proposals of Michigan and Massa-
chusetts governors).
58. Quotation in text accompanying note 1 supra.
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No tax is perfect and the essential element missing from the Florida
tax structure is balance.59 Compared to the other states, Florida relies
on sales taxation quite heavily.6" Selective excise taxes ordinarily
violate the tax principle of economic neutrality by discriminating against
the business activities taxes; they seem to be near the limit in Florida,
and the general sales tax appears to be headed upward toward its limit,
wherever that may be.6
"The general regressiveness of the tax is not so much an argument
against use of the sales tax, but against excessive reliance upon it as
an element in the overall tax structure."62 It is not proposed to eliminate
the sales tax. That would not be realistic because sales taxes, although
enacted in emergencies, are so productive they become permanent."3
The trend, however, is for states to use both income and sales taxes.64
On such a dual basis, some states have built, or are actively considering,
balanced tax structures.6 5 States in fetters are much less successful.
66
Constitutional provisions cannot avoid increases in total state
taxation, but only prevent the states "from utilizing some of the more
productive and, by current standards, more equitable tax sources,"
notably the individual income tax.6 7 The outlook for the coming years
compels legislative interest in the potential of state income taxes.68 To
exclude this major area of taxation from consideration by the Florida
Legislature in these times can only be justified by a persistent and over-
whelming desire to live in the nineteenth century.69
B. Other Taxes
The same provision of the Florida Constitution which prohibits an
income tax also bars taxes upon inheritances of residents or citizens of
59. SHULTZ & HARRISS, AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE 188 (8th ed. 1965); GROVES, Fi-
NANCING GOVERNMENT, ch. 2 (5th ed. 1958).
60. ACIR, MEASURES OF STATE & LOCAL FISCAL CAPACITY & TAX EFFORT 37-43 (1962).
See also Allen & Fryman, Comparison of Revenues & Expenditures in Income & Non-Income
Tax States in 1962, 17 NAT'L TAX J. 357, 359, 361 (1964).
61. SLY & FRANK, BUSINESS TAXES IN FLORIDA 20 (1964); SLY, TAX ASSETS & TAX
POLICIES IN FLORIDA 30 (1964).
62. DUE, SALES TAXATION 37 (1957).
63. Id. at 386.
64. MAXWELL, op. cit. supra note 29, 103. Even Wisconsin, home of the first successful
state income tax, now has a sales tax too; some of the new revenues, however, are allocated
to local governments on the express condition of limiting property taxes. Becker, The
Wisconsin State Tax Dilemma, 1963 NAT'L TAX A. PROC. 307.
65. Papke, Indiana Tax Policy: Revision, Reform, Reconstruction, 17 NAT'L TAX J. 113
(1964); 43 TAXES 669-70 (1965) (proposals of Michigan and Massachusetts governors).
66. Harsch, The Washington Tax System-How It Grew, 39 WASH. L. REV. 944 (1965);
see also McClelland, Nebraska-Taxes in Transition, 1963 NAT'L TAX A. PROC. 387.
67. Landers, Constitutional Provisions on Taxation & Finance, 33 STATE GoV'T 39, 42
(1960).
68. Ecker-Racz, State Taxes for the 1970's, 39 STATE GOV'T 14, 17-18 (1966).
69. Item: The Florida Constitutional Revision Committee has decided to retain the
prohibition against any income tax. Miami Herald, April 13, 1966, p. 19, col. 1.
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Florida, except for an inheritance or estate tax in an amount not more
than the credit for state death taxes allowed by the federal estate tax.7°
The exception was added after Florida unsuccessfully challenged the
federal system of credits in the Supreme Court.7' Recently, the highest
court of Florida carried the generous spirit of the constitutional provision
to its logical extreme and held that the Florida tax must be reduced by
any part of the federal credit consumed by death taxes of other states,
so that Florida law never leads to an increased total death tax.7 Although
the fairness and effects of death taxation may be somewhat unclear,7
the decisions, as in the case of the much more important income tax,
should be up to the Legislature; its right to choose outweighs any
need to assure a tax haven for wealthy "snowbirds."
Property tax issues, including the constitutional commandments
to tax intangibles and exempt motor vehicles, will be treated, for the
most part, in the discussion of local taxation. But it seems appropriate
to comment here on the idea of a severance tax, a proposal that is
politically exciting and theoretically attractive,74 though perhaps of
limited significance for Florida.75 If a severance tax is construed to be
a property tax, 6 it might run afoul of the "uniform and equal" clause
of the state constitution77  and would probably violate the stricture
against state use of ad valorem taxes on tangible property. 7S There is
reason to believe, however, that the Florida Supreme Court would hold
a severance tax to be a valid excise tax rather than a property tax.7 9
C. Earmarking
Only about sixty percent of Florida tax revenue becomes part of
the General Fund; the rest is earmarked by constitution or statute for
specified functions.80 Until 1993, two cents per gallon of the gasoline
tax is assigned to county road financing by constitutional mandate.8'
70. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 11.
71. Note 47 supra.
72. Green v. State ex rel. Phipps, 166 So.2d 585 (Fla. 1964). The court also relied on
the precise wording of the taxing statute applying to estates of residents. FLA. STATE § 198.02
(1965). Section 198.03 provides for taking a portion of the federal credit with respect to
estates of non-residents; if construed less generously, it might violate rights granted by the
federal constitution. Cf. HELLERSTEIN, STATE & LOCAL TAXATION 53, 57-58 (2d ed. 1961).
73. SiuLTZ & HARRISS, AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE 387-91 (8th ed. 1965).
74. VIEG ET AL., CALIFORNIA LOCAL FINANCE 220-21 (1960).
75. Compared to other states, Florida has a low base for a severance tax. ACIR,
MEASURES OF STATE & LOCAL FISCAL CAPACITY & TAX EFFORT 68 (1962).
76. See HELLERSTEIN, STATE & LOCAL TAXATION 38-39 (2d ed. 1961).
77. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1. This is discussed further under local property taxation.
78. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
79. Cf. Jerome H. Sheip Co. v. Amos, 100 Fla. 863, 130 So. 699 (1930) (motor fuel
storage tax); C. V. Floyd Fruit Co. v. Florida Citrus Comm'n, 128 Fla. 565, 175 So. 248
(1937) (citrus tax).
80. SLY, TAX ASSETS & TAX POLICIES IN FLORIDA 11-12 (1964). Some of these earmarked
funds go to local governments; this situation will be discussed further under local taxation.
81. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 16.
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Motor vehicle licensing revenues, originally pledged until 1983 to finance
education capital outlays,82 were repledged until 2001 by a 1964 con-
stitutional amendment.8" The questionable gross receipts tax on utilities
and communications84 was dedicated until 2015 to university and college
capital outlays, by a 1963 constitutional amendment.85 At the same time,
still another provision was enacted inviting the Legislature to earmark
some tax source until 2013 to finance the acquisition of recreational
areas;8 6 actually, a stiff excise tax on sports equipment had already been
levied and pledged.8" Of course, some legislative earmarking is not tied
to bond financing;88 but, where bonds are involved, the commitment
becomes permanent until the bonds are retired.8
Several things explain the development of earmarking: the growth
of user charges, a history of poor budget procedures, pressure groups,
and voter dissatisfaction with legislative decisions.9 There are good
arguments for its use: assurance of support for long-range programs,
the benefit theory of taxation, avoiding repetitive legislative decisions on
recurring items, support of borrowing by assuring debt service and
matching fees with costs (e.g., regulatory licensing)." On the balance,
however, it is an inefficient way to allocate resources, preventing the
best use of every dollar in light of the whole picture, reflecting a lack
of faith in the American legislative system, and resulting in sadly over-
working the unearmarked dollar. 2 In essence, it is a practice that should
be avoided."
This study does not cover borrowing. One cannot help but note,
though, that most Florida constitutional earmarking is a substitute for
82. FLA. CONST. art XII, § 18 (1952).
83. FLA. CONST. art. XII, § 18 (1964).
84. See Harriss, Taxation of Public Utilities: Considerations for the Long Run, 43
TAXES 660 (1965).
85. FLA. CONST. art. XII, § 19.
86. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 17.
87. Wholesale Fishing and Other Equipment Revenue Act, Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-527
(now FLA. STAT. §§ 212.50-.58 (1965)).
88. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 199.331 (1965) (part of intangible tax revenues earmarked for
state and local employee's benefits).
89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. (1). The Florida Constitutional Revision Committee
has decided to retain the constitutional earmarking of the gasoline tax and the sports
equipment tax until the respective bonds are retired. Miami Herald, April 13, 1966, p. 19-A,
col. 1.
90. Wileden, Earmarking: Good or Bad?, 33 STATE GOV'T 251 (1960).
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid; Landers, Constitutional Provisions on Taxation & Finance, 33 STATE Gov'T
39, 42 (1960) ; SHULTZ & HARRISS, AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE 191-92 (8th ed. 1965) (except
where mathematically related like payroll taxes and old-age benefits). Some would approve
earmarking linked to costs or benefits, such as assigning gasoline taxes to highway expendi-
tures. MAXwELL, FINANCING STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 221 (1965). For an interesting
analysis of earmarking in terms of the laws of supply and demand, see Buchanan, The
Economics of Earmarked Taxes, 71 J. POL. EcoN. 457 (1963).
93. SLY, TAX ASSETS & TAX POLICIES IN FLORIDA 31 (1964).
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issuing general obligation bonds of the state, which are prohibited to
the legislature other than for repelling insurrection or invasion.94 Such
revenue bonds are an expensive substitute,95 and the avoidance of, and
ban on, general obligation bonds might well be ended9" or reformed
to a restraint worded in terms of state revenue.97
III. LOCAL TAXATION
A. The Basic State Attitude
It is the responsibility of each state to assure proper financing of
its local governments, for the state creates local governments as sub-
divisions of itself. Thus, the state must provide financial means, including
areawide taxing powers, nonproperty tax authority, state grants and
shared taxes. The state must furnish research and planning and must
serve as a middleman between the federal and local levels to secure
fiscal stability of its local governments.
Late last century, however, the development of state and local
taxation went through a fairly definite cycle of "separation of state and
local revenue," 9 and the Florida constitution has been construed to
require a rather strict allocation of state revenues to "state purposes"
and local revenues to "local purposes.""' There are exceptions for the
death tax based on the wording of the constitutional provision'0 ' and
for the intangible tax because it has a distinct basis in the Constitution.'0 2
Pari-mutuel pool taxes may be allocated to the counties. 3 But
the doctrine of separation of fiscal systems has permeated the local
level as well, and such allocations may not be made for "municipal
94. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 6.
95. See ACIR, 1966 STATE LEGISLATIVE PRooGAM 84 (1965) (local borrowing).
96. See ibid.
97. If there is any limitation, it is suggested that it include all state bonds except those
of really self-supporting state businesses and that it relate to average state revenue. Landers,
Constitutional Provisions on Taxation & Finance, 33 STATE Gov'T 39, 44 (1960).
98. BIRD, THE STATE IMPACT ON METROPOLITAN AREA FINANCE, in FINANCING METRO-
POLITAN GOVERNMENT 150 (1955). Dr. Bird has urged that states recognize "that state and
local revenue comprise one revenue system because they must come from the same totality
of resources" and that the system must meet "the totality of state-local revenue needs."
How High the Curbs?, 52 NAT'L Civ. REv. 73, 78 (1963).
99. "[PJroperty taxes were left increasingly to local government and new sources of
revenue were sought at the state level." SLY, TAX ASSETS & TAX POLICIEs IN FLOamA 13
(1964).
100. Amos v. Matthews, 99 Fla. 1, 126 So. 308 (1930) (state taxes not available to pay
county bonds); cf. authorities cited note 104 infra. Compare Carlton v. Matthews, 103 Fla.
301, 137 So. 815 (1931) (state taxes available to buy county roads newly designated as
state roads); Florida v. Inter-American Center Authority, 143 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1962) (state
taxes available for localized state function).
101. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 11.
102. FIA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; State ex rel. Watson v. Lee, 157 Fla. 62, 24 So.2d 798
(1946).
103. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 15.
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purposes" as opposed to "county purposes."' 4 Such rules compound the
general problem of meeting local needs from taxes of a sufficiently large
area;0 5 the Florida Constitution permits the division of counties for
assessment administration,' but there is no authority to create inter-
county assessment offices.'0" Such rules also highlight the burden on
incorporated areas and on truly rural sections of paying county taxes
for services to the unincorporated urban fringe areas. 108 The only
general authority for counties to meet this problem is the power in
the Dade County home rule amendment to set up special taxing dis-
tricts,0 9 but the better procedure is to encourage the use of subordinate
service areas (higher county tax rates in the areas getting the extra
service) 110
Presumably, the reapportioned legislature will be more cognizant
of local problems and of the responsibility of the state to solve them.
It would not be amiss to reform Florida constitutional and statutory
limitations accordingly. Current Florida aid to its cities consists almost
entirely of shared cigarette taxes,"' and aid to its counties is largely
grants conditioned on use, particularly for education and roads." 2
The latter situation is one of the results of the earmarking discussed
earlier; another result is apportionment among the counties by formulas
that totally fail to take into account the disproportionate needs of
urban areas."'
New York has led the way along a different path with unconditional
104. Okaloosa County Water & Sewer Dist. v. Hilburn, 160 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1964) (allo-
cation for water and sewage in unincorporated area upheld); Kirkland v. Phillips, 106 So.2d
909 (Fla. 1958) (allocation for county port authority upheld); City of Lynn Haven v. Bay
County, 47 So.2d 894 (Fla. 1950) (allocation to municipal hospital held invalid).
105. See Netzer, Paying for Services, 51 NAT'L Civ. Rav. 195, 197-98 (1962).
106. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 7.
107. A Florida constitutional provision that municipalities should make their own as-
sessments (in § five of article nine) was construed to mean that cities could not be forced
to use county rolls. Vassar v. Arnold, 154 Fla. 757, 18 So.2d 906 (1944). After many single
county amendments to article eight, a 1954 amendment finally empowered the legislature
to require municipal use of county rolls. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 22 (but requiring muni-
cipal referendum).
108. Prentice, The Great Urban Tax Tangle, Fortune, March 1965, p. 106, at 195.
109. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 11, c. (1)(e).
110. ACIR, 1966 STATE LEGISIATIVE PROGRAM 47-53 (1965).
111. FLORIDA COMPTROLLER, FLORIDA TAXES & EXEMPTIONS, 1965-1966, at 18.
112. Id. at 19.
113. Pari-mutuel taxes must be apportioned to the counties "in equal amounts." FLA.
CoNsT. art. IX, § 15. The Florida Constitutional Revision Committee has found the equality
requirement a difficult one to vary. Miami Herald, April 13, 1966, p. 19-A, col. 1.
Section 208.08 of the Florida Statutes summarizes the rather thorough earmarking of
gasoline tax revenues. Almost all of the first four cents per gallon goes to the construction
and maintenance of state roads. See FLA. STAT. §§ 208.09-.10 (1965). Then two cents goes
to the counties for road financing on a three-factor formula: area, population and pre-
July 1, 1931 contributions to the state road system. FLA. CONsT. art. IX, § 16, confirming
Fla. Laws 1931, ch. 15659 (now FLA. STAT. § 208.11 (1965)). Apportionment of the seventh
and last cent is the same, by legislative direction. FLA. STAT. § 208.44(3) (1965).
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per capita grants to local governments, at increased rates to areas of
denser population." 4 "Only a state with a good tax system and good
administration can make such grants;""' but, looking forward to that
day, the Florida legislature should be free to consider a balanced program
of substantial aid to its local governments:
Where activities are to be stimulated, conditional grants and
shared revenues may be expected to continue, particularly those
supported by tradition and also by aggressive pressure groups.
General purpose grants are needed in addition by most munici-
palities. It is believed that this need can best be met by dif-
ferential per capita grants, freely given where the quality of
government meets expected standards."'
B. The Property Tax
The obligation of the states to solve local fiscal problems applies
with full force to the taxation of property:
Since the state creates local governments and determines their
share of the governing role, it must see to it that they possess
the financial resources required to match their responsibilities.
The obligation of the state in this regard is inescapable because
if the locally raised revenue is inadequate to finance the duties
prescribed for local governments, the state must provide it."
7
Florida law on property taxation violates this principle roundly, hindering
both the imposition of a sound tax and its effective administration.
1. CLASSIFICATION
In connection with the Florida legislative power to authorize county
and city taxes, it is required that "all property shall be taxed upon the
principles established for State taxation.""' 8 As mentioned earlier, one
of those state principles is uniformity and equality." 9 As in many states,
this means that all property in a jurisdiction must be taxed the same,
without classification. 2 °
With respect to real property, one group urges that improvements
be assessed lower (the graded property tax) or not at all, to discourage
land speculation and to encourage high-quality buildings.' 2' An opposing
114. See generally Conroy, Municipal Sharing in State Revenues, 35 MUmc. FIN. 60
(1962).
115. Chatters, New Money for Cities, 50 NAT'L Civ. REV. 298, 300 (1961).
116. Leland, AN IDEAL THEORETICAL PLAN OF FINANCE FOR A METROPOLITAN AREA, in
FINANCING METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT 233, 269-70 (1955).
117. ACIR, 1966 STATE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM 4 (1965).
118. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 5.
119. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
120. NEWHOUSE, CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY & EQUALITY IN STATE TAXATION 278-81
(1959).
121. Prentice, The Great Urban Tax Tangle, Fortune, Mar. 1965, p. 106, at 107, 188;
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view would tax outlying unimproved land less than land actually devel-
oped;1.. this is best done by the assessor considering restrictive agri-
cultural zoning, rather than by having him rely on actual agricultural
use.'23 Florida's "green belt" statutes, however, do depend on agricultural
use.'24 This has been upheld by two four-to-three decisions of the
Florida Supreme Court, 2 5 apparently as a method of valuation to which
the taxpayer is entitled if he timely claims it. 26 The decisions are ques-
tionable'27 as well as close, and they certainly are an inadequate legal
basis for local attempts to classify real property. 2 8
For example, an earlier legislative attempt to classify personal
property and direct assessment of stock in trade at twenty-five percent
of full value was held to violate the Florida Constitution.'2 9 The 1965
legislature has tried to avoid the decision by giving the assessors a
number of "outs" in valuing inventory.1 3 0 Indeed, the need to exclude
non-business personal property, such as household items, from property
taxation for administrative reasons is generally conceded' 3 ' and some
would tax only real property. 32 Another experiment that might fail
because of the uniformity and equality clause is a "free port" law
exempting goods temporarily stored in Florida for shipment out of state.
33
Intangible property is subject to rather unusual treatment under
the Florida Constitution. It is classified, in that the legislature "may
provide for special rate or rates" of tax thereon.'3 4 Also, intangible
Williams, Pittsburgh's Pioneering in Scientific Taxation, 21 Am. J. ECON. & Soc. 37, 209
(1962) and related articles; 22 Am. J. EcoN. & Soc. 149, 251 (1963); see Netzer, Paying
for Services, 51 NAT'L Civ. REV. 195, 197-98 (1962). Contra, Hagman, The Single Tax &
Land-Use Planning: Henry George Updated, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 762 (1965).
122. Hagman, Open Space Planning & Property Taxation-Some Suggestions, 1964
Wis. L. REV. 628.
123. Id. at 644-45.
124. See generally Wershow, Ad Valorem Assessments in Florida-Whither Now?, 18
U. FLA. L. REV. 9 (1965).
125. Lanier v. Overstreet, 175 So.2d 521 (Fla. 1965); Tyson v. Lanier, 156 So.2d 833
(Fla. 1963).
126. See Stiles v. Brown, 182 So.2d 612 (Fla. 1966).
127. Note, The Florida Constitution & Legislative Classification for Tax Assessment
Purposes, 17 U. FLA. L. REv. 609 (1965).
128. Authority to classify might enable the legislature, if it so desired, to exclude any
aesthetic values, such as were taxed in Joseph E. Seagram & Son, Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 14
N.Y.2d 314, 200 N.E.2d 447, 251 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1964), noted, 29 ALBANY L. REV. 158 (1965);
more likely, that is really a problem of defining value.
129. Franks v. Davis, 145 So.2d 228 (Fla. 1962).
130. FLA. STAT. § 192.05 (1965).
131. Lynn, Model Property Tax Report, 1964 NAT'L TAX A. PROC. 157, 170; BIm, THE
GENERAL PROPERTY TAx 68 (1960); Prentice, The Great Urban Tax Tangle, Fortune, Mar.
1965, p. 106, at 196. In fact, the personal property tax has become a tax on business personal
property to a large degree. Schaffer, Personal Property Taxation Today, 32 MuNic. Fn .
138 (1960).
132. Nichols, The Problem of Equity in Property Taxation, 37 MuNIc. FIN. 96, 99
(1964).
133. The suggestion is discussed in SLY & FRANx, BusINEss TAXEs IN FLORIDA 55 (1964).
134. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
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property is the one type that the state government can tax." 5 If the
state repeals its tax, it is quite possible that intangible property must
then be taxed at the same rate as tangible property.' In light of the
overwhelming criticism of intangible taxes, both for unenforceability
and for being a second layer of tax on much property,"3 7 such a risk
is an unfortunate limitation.
Classification has long been considered an important reform.'35
By now, attention has shifted to establishing the classes and rates. 35
Where uniformity and equality requirements prevent classification,
they must be relaxed. 40
2. EXEMPTIONS
Related to classification is the question of exemption. Florida's
constitution authorizes the legislature to exempt property of municipal,
educational, literary, scientific, religious and charitable purposes.''
The policy questions raised by such exemptions, similar to certain
federal exemptions from income tax, 4" are too manifold and controversial
to be explored in this study. 43 Suffice it to say that the legislature seems
to have some discretion in defining these exemptions.'44
However, the Florida homestead exemption of the first five thousand
dollars of assessed value is only subject to legislative regulation regard-
ing "the manner of establishing the right."'45 A survey of 1957 figures
showed that about thirty-five percent of the gross assessed value of
property in Florida was exempt as homestead, the highest percentage in
the nation. 46 Because of a low ratio of assessed value to market value,
the survey concluded that the average homestead exemption in Florida
135. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
136. See NEWHOUSE, op. cit. supra note 120, at 279-81.
137. Lynn, supra note 131, at 169; Bird, op. cit. supra note 131. But see Blackburn,
Intangible Taxes: A Neglected Revenue Source for States, 18 NAT'L TAX J. 214 (1965).
138. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION ch. XX (10th ed. rev. 1925).
139. See Lynn, supra note 131, at 167-78.
140. 1 ACIR, THE ROLE OF THE STATES IN STRENGTHENING THE PROPERTY TAX 34-35
(1963).
141. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
142. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(3).
143. See generally, e.g., Barnett, The Struggle to Curtail Abuses by Private Foundations;
New Legislation Likely, 23 J. TAXATION 300 (1965); Haines v. St. Petersburg Methodist
Home, Inc., 173 So.2d 176 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
144. See Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist. v. Paul, 179 So.2d 349,
355 (Fla. 1965); Coppock v. Blount, 145 So.2d 279, 282 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962) (dictum); cf.
Miller v. Doss, 46 So.2d 888 (Fla. 1950). But cf. FLA. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 16 (corporate
property).
145. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 7. The substantive language has produced a fair amount of
litigation. See generally Crosby & Miller, Homestead Exemption, A Legal Chameleon in
Florida: V, 2 U. FLA. L. REV. 346 (1949).
146. BIRD, THE GENERAL PROPERTY TAX 21 (1960).
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was actually excluding approximately 12,200 dollars of value from
taxation. 4
Higher assessment ratios, discussed below, have probably mitigated
these situations to some degree,' but even at full value assessments
there is a concession to residential property at the expense of business
property. 4 ' This exemption simply removes too much property from
taxation and should not be mandatory. Some suggested compromises are
limiting it to senior citizens, leaving it to local option, and the 1964
amendment permitting Sarasota County, with respect to school taxes, to
assess the first 2,000 dollars of value and exempt the next 5,000 dollars.5 0
Other mandatory exemptions include 500 dollars of assessed value
for each widow and each disabled person15 ' and 500 dollars in value of
household goods and personal effects for each head of a family. 5 2 The
former, though no doubt motivated by admirable compassion, is certainly
an obsolete and inadequate method of giving welfare assistance not
based on need. The exemption of personal property for the head of a
family should be superfluous, since those type of personal property should
not be taxed, as discussed earlier.
A significant exemption from local property taxes arises from
the constitutional provision that the license tax on motor vehicles be
in lieu of all property taxes. 3 It is said that urban motorists are
pampered by light local taxation compared with the "multibillion cost
of local streets." 54 Another point is the need to discourage the use
of motor vehicles in congested urban areas and thereby to encourage
the use of public mass transportation.'55 Notwithstanding the propaganda
of the automobile lobby, there should be more freedom for local govern-
ments to experiment in this area.
147. Id. at 43-44.
148. But exempt homestead values increase too. Miami Herald, March 31, 1966, p. 12-B,
Col. 1.
149. SLY & FRANK, BusnEss TAXES IN FLORIDA 55-56 (1964). Businessmen are more
concerned with the real property tax than any other Florida tax. Id. at 35-36.
150. Id. at 56.
151. FLA. CoNsT. art. IX, § 9.
152. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 11. By legislation, this is now an exemption of 1000 dollars.
FLA. STAT. § 192.201 (1965).
153. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 13.
154. Prentice, The Great Urban Tax Tangle, Fortune, Mar. 1965, p. 106, at 196; accord,
Chatters, New Money for Cities, 50 NAT'L Cv. Rxv. 298, 300 (1961). At a state level, for
the year ended June 30, 1965, Florida collected about 245 million dollars in gasoline and
auto license taxes; about 267 millions were spent on highway operations and about 47 mil-
lions of the gasoline tax were remitted to the counties, or a total outgo of approximately
314 million dollars. FLORIDA COMPTROLLER, FLORIDA TAXEs & EXEMPTIONS, 1965-1966, at 18.
155. Walker, What is a Fair Tax Source for Local Governments?, 32 MuRIc. FiN. 69,
73-74 (1959). It is likely that taxes will be needed to support cheap public mass transporta-
tion, too. See Brooks, Lindsay, Quill, & the Transit Strike, Commentary, March 1966, p. 50,
at 57.
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3. RATE LIMITATIONS
Exemptions as well as low assessment ratios put pressures on millage
limits. Fortunately, of the major general rate limits on property taxes
in Florida, only the one affecting school boards is constitutional;'"
those for counties 57 and cities 5 ' are statutory. At least in theory, they
ishould all be repealed.6 9 They encourage the creation of special
districts, lead to excessive borrowing, require many special laws, impair
budgeting, promote litigation and sometimes give the assessors control
of the budget.' At a minimum, such limits should not be constitutional
or apply to home rule areas, should be based on market rather than
assessed values, should not be in terms of specific functions and should
permit relief by referendum after approval by state authorities.161
Perhaps pressures on the property tax can also be relieved somewhat by
its efficient administration and by non-property taxes; 16 2 these are
the next subjects.
4. ASSESSMENT ADMINISTRATION
In Florida, reform of property assessment in the last few years
has been largely the work of the courts.' Substantial gains in assessment
ratios and aggregate rolls have resulted,"' but certain major steps seem
difficult or impossible under present Florida law.
To begin with, there is the urgent need for proJessionalization of
property assessment;'6 5 election of assessors stands squarely in the
way. " '6 Election of county tax assessors is mandatory under the Florida
156. FLA. CONST. art. XII, § 10.
157. FLA. STAT. § 193.32 (1965); see FLA. STAT. § 150.08 (1965) (library tax). But see
FLA. CONST. art. XII, § 8 (county school tax).
158. FLA. STAT. § 167.44 (1965). This is the general law; many cities are chartered
under special laws.
159. ACIR, 1966 STATE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM 84-93 (1965).
160. ACIR, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL & STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON LOCAL TAxneG
POwERS 4 (1962); Magill, Can We Afford Present Local Debt & Tax Rate Limitations?,
37 MUNIC. FIN. 70, 72 (1964) ; Bird, How High the Curbs?, 52 NAT'L Civ. REV. 72, 77-78
(1963).
161. ACIR, op. cit. supra note 160, at 6-9.
162. See Walker, The Significance of Governmental Patterns in Evaluating Tax & Debt
Limits, Tax Policy, Aug.-Sept., 1964, p. 5, at 7.
163. See generally Wershow, Ad Valorem Assessments in Florida-Whither Now?, 18
U. FLA. L. REV. 9 (1965). Progress in procedural law as well as in substantive law is in-
volved in the reform movement. E.g., Townsend v. Gray, 181 So.2d 612 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966)
(declaratory relief permitted).
There may be a federal constitutional basis for individual relief. Schooley v. Sunset
Realty Corp., 185 So.2d 1 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966) (allowing reduction of prior year's assess-
ment). But see Dade County v. Salter, No. 34,035, Fla. Sup. Ct., May 11, 1966, quashing
170 So.2d 57 (3d Dist. 1965) (reaching opposite result without mention of federal constitu-
tion).
164. See Miami Herald, March 31, 1966, p. 12-B, col. 1; Tax Rolls Leap $5.7 Billion-
Court Decisions Up Assessments.
165. Lynn, Model Tax Report, 1964 NAT'L TAX A. PRoC. 157, 164-65.
166. BIn, T3E GENERAL PROPERTY TAX 68-69 (1960).
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Constitution, 167 except under the Dade County home rule amendment.'
Since the legislature can prescribe the "powers, duties and compensa-
tion"16 of county assessors, some additional duties can be placed on
county assessors,'170 but an assessor can delegate ministerial work to
professionals only provided he alone exercises the official discretion
involved in assessment.1 7 1
There is an urgent need for greater state participation in local
property assessment. 72 Opinion as to how much more runs the gamut,'
with some feeling that complete state administration is necessary." 4
Constitutional duties of the Florida Comptroller are to "examine, audit,
adjust and settle the accounts of all officers of the State and perform
such other duties as may be prescribed by law"; 75 thus he may be given
limited supervisory authority over municipal financial affairs." Develop-
ments in the administration of Florida local property taxes during the
last decade show a marked tendency to rely on supervision by the
Comptroller, but without adequate budget for him to do the job right.'77
This tendency, combined with the constitutional direction that the
legislature "shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valua-
tion of all property,"'7 8 recently clashed with the constitutional status
of the county tax assessor in a suit decided in the Leon County Circuit
Court. 79 In an impressive summary of the relevant Florida law, the
opinion reaches these conclusions: duties of a county assessor cannot be
abolished or transferred so as to deprive the citizens of their right to
elect him; legislative authority is limited to checks and balances against
abuses of power by county assessors; no state executive officer can
change county assessment ratios; and the statutory authority' S for
the Comptroller to bring suit to compel a county assessor to perform
his duties must be based on gross disregard of those duties, the final
determination always being judicial.
167. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6.
168. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 11, c. (1) (1); State ex rel. Glynn v. McNayr, 133 So.2d
312 (Fla. 1961).
169. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6.
170. Stoudenmire v. West Volusia Hosp. Authority, 113 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1959).
171. Peters v. Hansen, 157 So.2d 103 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
172. ACIR, 1966 STATE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM 6-25 (1965); MAXWELL, FINANCING STATE
& LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 154-56. (1965).
173. Lynn, Model Property Tax Report, 1964 NAT'L TAX A. PROC. 157, 166.
174. James, School Aid Apportionment: State Action Needed on the Property Tax, 33
STATE GOV'T 256 (1960).
175. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 23.
176. Coen v. Lee, 116 Fla. 215, 156 So. 747 (1934).
177. 2 ACIR, THE ROLE OF THE STATES IN STRENGTHENING THE PROPERTY TAX 29-32
(1963).
178. FA. CONsT. art. IX, § 1.
179. Butscher v. Burns, Chancery No. 20788, Mar. 2, 1966, Declaratory Decree recorded
in Official Records Book 214, pp. 66-74, Leon County, Florida public records.
180. FLA. STAT. § 196.16 (1965).
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Based on the foregoing rules, the court imposed the following
duties on the Comptroller: to assist and advise county assessors; to do
such research and study as he finds necessary to form an opinion con-
cerning county assessment ratios;' 8 ' to refuse to approve county assess-
ment recapitulations and rolls (with varying statutory effect) if he
finds "intentional, arbitrary and systematic" undervaluation; to bring
a mandamus action if he finds a "substantial" degree of undervaluation;
to recommend to the governor removing the county assessor if he finds
the violation is "willful" and he considers this the only means to secure
compliance; to recognize that assessments are matters of opinion and
not to substitute his own for honest and reasonable opinions of local
assessors.
As if that were not enough, the Comptroller appealed to the Florida
Supreme Court urging that he has no right to reassess properties already
assessed by a county tax assessor. 82 Although the decree of the lower
court was affirmed,"" one cannot help but conclude that effective state
participation in local property tax assessments may be seriously ham-
strung by the constitutional elective status of county tax assessors. Such
status should be abolished and the legislature given unlimited authority
to determine the extent of state participation.
A state tax court is strongly recommended to afford taxpayers a
convenient and inexpensive way to secure expert review of disputed
assessments."8 4 Circuit courts in Florida have long had "exclusive original
jurisdiction . . . in all cases involving the legality of any tax, assess-
ment or toll,"'8 5 so that a constitutional amendment would be necessary.'
Yet, with all of the recommended changes in assessment administra-
tion, perfect uniformity is not feasible.18 7 Contemporary uses of real
property alone are becoming overly sophisticated, and defy sensible
assessment." This, and more fundamental reasons, compel a study of
alternative local taxes.
181. The determination must be that of the Comptroller, but he may consider and give
such weight as he deems appropriate to the findings of the Railroad Assessment Board
under FLA. STAT. § 195.01(6). Butscher v. Burns, supra note 179.
182. Brief of Appellants, pp. 27-35, Burns v. Butscher, 187 So.2d 594 (Fla. 1966).
183. Burns v. Butscher, supra note 182.
184. ACIR, 1966 STATE LEGiSLATiVE PROGRAm 33-42 (1965); Lynn, Model Property Tax
Report, 1964 NAT'L TAx A. Paoc. 157, 186; Kray, California Tax Court: An Approach to
Progressive Tax Administration, 37 So. CAL. L. REV. 485 (1964).
185. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 6, cl. (3). This is the 1956 judiciary amendment, but the
quoted language dates back to 1885. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 11 (1885).
186. Perhaps the Florida judiciary, having led the reform of assessment procedures in
the state, would afford a more gracious treatment to such a proposed amendment than has
been given in California. See Kray, supra note 184, at 519-20.
187. BiRD, THE GENERAL PROPERTY TAX 28-29 (1960).
188. E.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 711 (1965) (condominiums); Thomas, Financing on "Air
Rights"-A Case History, A.B.A. Tax Sect. Bull. Jan. 1965, p. 90, at 96.
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C. Nonproperty Taxes
One of the fiercest dilemmas facing local governments is the property
tax: it is both a 'bad tax and an essential one. It is a bad tax because gross
property, especially real property, is not (and possibly never was) a good
measure of income or even net wealth.8 9 Property taxes do not relate
to the benefits received from modern expensive public functions like
education 9 ' and do not adequately reach the non-residents who nowadays
so often work and play in urban areas."9 Property values react slowly
to economic changes "2 and assessments cannot keep up even at that
pace,' all in addition to the imperfectability of assessment administra-
tion discussed earlier.
Yet the property tax is a necessary tax for local governments and
they must rely on it heavily.' For every government that is to be
significant must have its own fiscal power, 95 and no alternative local
levies have inspired resounding confidence yet. In fact, some students of
taxation indicate that major alternative taxes should be available only
at the state level,' although other authority would approve local non-
property levies if they supplement similar state taxes or are at least
administered by the state.9 7 However, it seems that experimentation
with local nonproperty taxes is essential simply because property taxes
are going to be inadequate at any reasonable rates;9 8 if they cannot
be replaced, they must at least be supplemented.
For nearly a century, it has been the law in the United States that
local governments have only those taxing powers specifically granted;"9
therefore, it is up to the Florida legislature to act. Its power seems
clear: the constitutional permission to "authorize the several counties
and incorporated cities or towns in the State to assess and impose taxes"2°0
189. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION, ch. II, at 61-62 (10th ed. 1925); Clark, Municipal
Nonproperty Revenues, Tax Policy, Aug.-Sept. 1964, p. 9, at 10 (over 75 per cent of personal
income from nonproperty sources).
190. Cartwright, The Washington Tax Structure as Viewed by the Consumer, 39 WASH.
L. REv. 1000, 1007 (1965); VIEG ET AL., CALIFORNIA LOCAL FINANCE 189 (1960).
191. BUEHLER, REVENUE IMPROVEMENTS UNDER PRESENT LAWS & GOVERNMENT STRUC-
TURE, in FINANCING METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT 200, 207-08 (1955).
192. Ibid.
193. Cartwright, supra note 190; VIEG ET AL., op. cit. supra note 190, at 160. Compare
Fleming, Procedures that Assessors Use in Keeping Property Valuations Up-to-Date, 25 J.
TAXATION 58 (1966).
194. MAXWELL, FINANCING STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 154-56 (1965); ACIR, STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL & STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON LOCAL TAXING POWERS 53-59 (1962).
195. Quotation in text accompanying note 1 supra.
196. BUEHLER, supra note 191, at 211-14; see VIEG ET AL., op. cit. supra note 190, at
210-12, 215.
197. ACIR, op. cit. supra note 194, at 14-15.
198. American City, July 1963, p. 7; BUEHLER, supra note 191, at 207-08.
199. ACIR, op. cit. supra note 194, at 81.
200. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 5.
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is construed to allow the legislature to authorize a particular tax for
a particular local government, or for some or all local governments.2 0
Florida local governments have made relatively extensive use of
nonproperty taxes, mainly licenses and selective excise taxes.2 °2 Their
use of the shared cigarette tax is limited,28 and they cannot tax alcohol
or gasoline sales.0 4 In light of comments discussed earlier in connection
with the exemption of motor vehicles from property taxes, an attempt
to use local gasoline taxes may be in order. More important would be
experiments in the use of major local nonproperty taxes.
1. SALES TAX
Of the major local nonproperty taxes, the one most used is the
sales tax. New York City has led the way since 1934 and now leads with
a four percent rate, but it is an unusual case.2 5 A 1935 three percent
tax in Daytona Beach led to a retailers' boycott and was repealed after
one week with a refund of collections; the same year Miami enacted
a sales tax but repealed it before the effective date.206 There were still
only a handful of local sales taxes in the United States in 1945, but by
the end of 1964 sales taxation was used by 2,133 cities, 194 counties
and two school districts; it was a minor source of total local tax revenue
but very important for the local governments employing it.20 7
Successful administration depends on central administration by the
state0 " unless a large and isolated urban area is involved."0 9 Of the
2,329 local sales taxes at the end of 1964, 2,148 were collected by the
states.210 California made a major change in 1955 by enacting a centrally
collected tax much more attractive to its cities than the then existing
independently administered taxes; the cities changed over.21' Proposed
federal rules on taxing interstate sales would drastically limit local
taxation of such sales unless collected by the state. 12
As of the beginning of 1963, twelve states and the District of
Columbia harbored local sales taxes, but of these only three states did
201. Wilson v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, 138 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1962).
202. BiRD, TnE GENERAL PROPERTY TAX 11 (1960).
203. FLA. STAT. § 210.03(1) (1965).
204. FLA. STAT. §§ 561.50 and 208.44(13) (1965).
205. American City, supra note 198.
206. Spec. Subcomm., 3 State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, H.R. REP. No. 565,
89th Cong., Ist Sess. 842 (1965).
207. Id. at 846-51.
208. See generally DuE, STATE SALES TAx ADMINISTRATION, ch. XI (1963).
209. Chatters, New Money for Cities, 50 NAT'L Civ. REv. 298, 301 (1961).
210. Spec. Subcomm., op. cit. supra note 206, at 871.
211. Id. at 865-66.
212. Spec. Subcomm., 4 State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, H.R. REP. No. 952,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1187 (1965), incorporated in H.R. 11798, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
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not have state sales taxes;2"3 obviously Florida fits the pattern of a
local tax supplemental to the state tax. Perhaps the most significant
choice is between making the local tax mandatory, as in Illinois, or
letting each local government decide, as in California;" x4 if the option
in the latter case is not illusory because of compelling revenue needs, it
may mark the distinction between additional local fiscal power and just
another pre-apportioned state tax.
2. INCOME TAX
As indicated earlier, any income tax in Florida would require a
constitutional amendment. It may well be that a flat low-rate income
tax on wages and business profits is feasible, productive and equitable
for an urban area and reaches its "contact population."21 5 It is also
possible to reach all other income of residents"' but this creates double
taxation when other communities retaliate. 1 7
Personal local income taxation in modern form originated in Phila-
delphia in 1938 under permission granted by Pennsylvania in 1932.218
Its use spread to other local governments, particularly in Pennsylvania
and Ohio, but in 1953 over half of all local income taxes in the country
were collected by Philadelphia.219 The tax on wages must be enforced
by withholding; the tax on business profits is self-assessed and much
is evaded, but wages constitute the larger part of the base and the evasion
of taxes on business profits is not crucial."2
Toledo adopted a corporate income tax in 1946 and other Ohio
cities, as well as St. Louis and Louisville, followed suit.22' The revenues
produced are probably a very small part of total local income taxes.22
However, they produce a greater compliance problem proportionately
because of evasion by a large number of corporations with minimum
contacts.223
In 1953, income taxes produced only about two percent of total
municipal taxes. 2 4 However, in cities where used they were major
213. DuE, op. cit. supra note 208, 235.
214. Cf. id. at 243-44. Preferably, the taxing jurisdiction should include the whole market
area so as not to penalize stores in the jurisdiction. Walker, What is a Fair Tax Source for
Local Governments?, 32 Mumc. Fns. 69, 72 (1959).
215. Id. at 70-72.
216. SioAxoos, THE MuICIPAL INCOME TAX: ITS HIsToRY & PROBLEMS 19-20 (1955).
217. Id. at 27-31.
218. Spec. Subcomm., 1 State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, H.R. REP. No. 14:30,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 445-46 (1964).
219. SIGooos, op. cit. supra note 216, at 69.
220. Id. at 81-83.
221. Spec. Subcomm., op. cit. supra note 218, at 446-47.
222. Id. at 447-49.
223. Id. at 467-70.
224. SiGAroos, op. cit. supra note 216, at 69.
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sources of revenue.225 There is evidence that they enabled some of those
cities to hold the line on property taxes.2 A recent study predicts
increased reliance on income taxation by local governments. 2 27
3. GROSS RECEIPTS TAX
A study of California local finance urged greater use of local business
license taxes measured by gross receipts, in order to add revenue to
regulation. 22' As a practical matter, gross receipts taxes were a very
small part of total local tax revenues in 1963 and almost two-thirds
of the total local gross receipts taxes were collected by New York
City.229  Cities using such taxation varied widely in the reliance placed
upon it; its importance is expected to decline because of strong resistance
to any but very low rates.2"'
Only very low rates are suitable because the tax seems inequitable,
falling uniformly on businesses with much different profit margins.5 1
Further, gross receipts taxation penalizes those businesses where competi-
tion largely prevents shifting the burden of the tax; newer and smaller
businesses appear less able to pay the tax and larger businesses are
encouraged to integrate vertically to avoid the tax.2 2 Differential rates
can reflect the varying profit margins of different business groups and
can be structured to avoid pyramiding or the incentive to integrate,
but such adjustments destroy the main virtue of the tax, its simplicity.23
Overall, perhaps a balance of taxes is needed, depending on the
characteristics of the particular local community.234 There is some
conflict about whether or not the program should include various lesser
nonproperty taxes,2"5 but it seems agreed that size of the levying
jurisdiction is very important.236 Therefore, the legislature should begin
deliberate planned experimentation with tax regions comprising more
225. Ibid.; Spec. Subcomm., op. cit. supra note 218, at 447-50.
226. SroAFOOS, op. cit. supra note 216, at 87-91.
227. Spec. Subcomm., op. cit. supra note 218, at 450.
228. VIEG ET AL., CALIFORNIA LOCAL FINANCE 204-09 (1960); accord, Chatters, New
Money for Cities, 50 NAT'L Civ. REV. 298, 300, 303 (1961).
229. Spec. Subcomm., 3 State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, H.R. REP. No. 569,
89th Cong. 1st Sess. 1071 (1965).
230. Id. at 1071-73.
231. Walker, supra note 214; see Legler & Papke, Optimizing State Business Taxation:
An Application of Differential Impact Analysis, 18 NAT'L TAX J. 240 (1965).
232. Spec. Subcomm. op. cit. supra note 229, at 1020-22.
233. Id. at 1022-23.
234. See Fary, Tailoring Revenue Sources to the Community, 34 MuN-c. FIN. 39 (1961).
235. Compare ACIR, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL & STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON LOCAL
TAXING POWERS 14 (1962) (limitation to the few most productive), wvith Chatters, New
Money for Cities, 50 NAT'L Civ. REV. 298 (1961) (taxes on amusements and admissions,
transient hotel rooms, public utility franchises, motor vehicles and fuel).
236. ACIR, 1966 STATE LEGISLATIVE PRocRAm 45-46 (1965); Netzer, Paying for
Services, 51 NAT'L Civ. REV. 195, 197-98 (1962); Walker, supra note 214, at 74-75.
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than one local government as well as with the imposition of substantial
nonproperty taxes at the local level.
IV. CONCLUSION
Most of the steps recommended by this study have been suggested
before, 2' though perhaps more briefly and with less insistence. It is to
be expected that the statutory changes, at least those affecting local
taxation, have a fair chance of accomplishment in a legislature dominated
by urban senators and representatives. But will the legislators have the
courage to propose, and the citizens the wisdom to approve, the many
modifications of the Florida Constitution that are required?
There will be unnecessary grief in the future of the state if the chains
of habit, ignorance and fear now encased in the taxation provisions of
the constitution are permitted to prevent the legislators from serving
the people adequately. Let the citizens remember that constitutional
fetters on the taxing powers of the elected legislators are an admission
of a lack of belief in the system of representative democracy.13 Let both
the legislators and the citizens consider these quintessential conclusions
of distinguished experts in public finance:
Thoughtful men may differ on exactly what kind of provisions
belong in written constitutions and what should be left to
statutes and judicial interpretation. But the preponderance of
opinion would agree that a constitution is no place to embody
details about the kind of tax structure to be developed-nor the
rates to be imposed nor the uses of particular funds. Conditions
change so much that the best arrangement at one time can be
utterly obsolete a generation later. Changes in economic struc-
ture, the level of prices, the taxes imposed by the federal govern-
ment or neighboring states, the administrative capacity of
states, the role of local government, and the use of tax funds
are some of the developments which have already made well-
meant decisions of our fathers-and the successes of narrow
pressure groups-needless burdens today.3 9
237. E.g., SLY, TAX ASSETS & TAX POLICIS IN FLORIDA 31 (1964).
238. Landers, Constitutional Provisions on Taxation & Finance, 33 STATE GOV'T 39
(1960).
239. SHfULTZ & HARRISS, AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE 139 (8th. ed. 1965). On June 30,
1966, the Florida Constitutional Revision Commission unveiled its tentative complete draft.
Some of the changes urged by this study are slated for adoption. Others, including crucial
ones, fared worse. See generally Miami Herald, July 1, 1966, p. 1-A, col. 4 and p. 20-C,
col. 1; July 3, 1966, p 18-A, col. 2.
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